Coastal states of the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, joined by Iceland, have issued an open letter to the international maritime community, especially flag and port states, national authorities, flag registries, classification societies, shipping companies, managers, operators, and seafarers warning about the new emerging safety risks due to the growing Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) interference in European waters and particularly in the Baltic Sea region.
Signed by Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the letter stresses that these disturbances, originating from Russia, degrade the safety of international shipping and that “all vessels are at risk.”
They also highlight that the integrity of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) is equally vital, mentioning that spoofing or falsifying AIS data undermines maritime safety and security, increases the risk of accidents, and severely hampers rescue operations.
The co-signatories call upon the international maritime community and national authorities to recognise GNSS interference and AIS manipulation as threats to maritime safety and security; to ensure vessels have adequate capabilities and properly trained crew as required by international conventions to operate safely during navigation system outages; and to cooperate on the development of alternative terrestrial radionavigation systems which may be used in place of GNSS in the event of disruption, loss of signal or interference.
Furthermore, the states stress that the full implementation of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations is fundamental to ensuring maritime safety, the smooth functioning of shipping, and the protection of seafarers and the marine environment, especially in the new emerging situations affecting safety at sea, such as the increasing use of shadow fleet vessels to circumvent international sanctions.
In the letter, they also highlight -among other things- that vessels shall sail under the flag of only one state and that vessels sailing under the flags of two or more states shall be treated as a “ship without nationality.”
They also refer to issues regarding the need for vessels to maintain valid documentation and certification, for companies to maintain a safety management system onboard the vessels operated according to SOLAS Chapter IX (International Safety Management code), for flag states to ensure that ships flying their flag only proceed to sea in compliance with the requirements of the international rules and standards, for vessels to maintain the AIS and the long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) equipment continuously in operation, for ships to provide information about ship identification and any other required information when entering an area covered by a ship reporting system, and to maintain clear communication with relevant maritime authorities including in communication regarding ship reporting systems (SRS) and vessel traffic services (VTS).
The signatories also require vessels to report incidents involving the discharges of oil and other harmful substances as required by international and national rules, to carry on board shipboard oil and marine pollution emergency plans as required by the MARPOL Convention, to carry onboard flag approved ship-to-ship operations plans according to MARPOL Convention Annex I Reg. 41, and not to conduct ship-to-ship transfers without sufficient and timely notification to the coastal state in whose exclusive economic zone the transfer is to take place.
RIN report for GNSS interference in maritime sector
The UK’s Royal Institute of Navigation (RIN) issued recently its maritime report revealing the impacts of GNSS interference in the maritime sector. Survey data was compiled from over 100 sector experts and 300 vessel captains, supported by interviews with dozens of people involved in the operations and supply chain of vessels that regularly encounter GNSS interference.
In 2025, at least two collisions and groundings were reported in mainstream media linked to GNSS interference in regions such as the Baltics, Straits of Hormuz and the Red Sea.
With hundreds of vessels being affected daily, the RIN report details for the first time the scale of the problem on modern digital vessels whereby GNSS jamming and spoofing present a significant cybersecurity vulnerability and urgent risks to maritime safety.
Survey data exposes the vulnerability of critically important systems such as Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems (GMDSS) and other SOLAS-mandated equipment that rely on satellite positioning and timing.
“The report has highlighted serious safety concerns and has underlined the fact that these issues are rooted in significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and are not just disruptions to navigation,” says Dr Ramsey Faragher, director of the RIN.
