GNSS interference has become a growing challenge in the Baltic Sea, affecting maritime navigation, aviation, and critical infrastructure. While numerous datasets and services report high-altitude GNSS interference based on ADS-B data, there is a significant lack of studies focusing on ground-level interference.
Since most critical infrastructure relies on GNSS at ground level, this gap in research leaves many questions unanswered about the real-world impact of interference on essential systems.
GPSPATRON reported that together with Gdynia Maritime University have established a scientific and technical collaboration aimed at systematically studying GNSS interference at ground level.
The study, conducted from June to November 2024, utilized GPSPATRON’s proprietary GNSS interference monitoring system, integrating the GP-Probe TGE2-CH3 sensor and the GP-Cloud platform.
The sensor collects raw signal data, enabling comprehensive analysis of jamming, spoofing, and other anomalies affecting GNSS performance.
The sensor was installed on the Faculty of Navigation building at Gdynia Maritime University, directly on the shoreline at approximately 15 meters above sea level.
As reported, the primary goal of the research was to characterize the occurrence, patterns, and potential sources of GNSS interference affecting ground-level infrastructure.
Unlike previous studies that relied on ADS-B data from aircraft at high altitudes, this research focused on low-altitude and ground-based disruptions.
The study aimed to identify the nature of interference, assess its impact on GNSS accuracy, and explore potential mitigation strategies.
Key Findings:
A total of 84 hours of GNSS interference was detected, confirming persistent disruptions in the region, primarily caused by jamming rather than spoofing.
October recorded the highest interference activity, with six major jamming incidents totaling 29 hours, highlighting an intensified interference pattern.
Two primary interference types were identified:
Multi-constellation jamming, detected throughout June to September, indicating broad-spectrum interference affecting multiple GNSS systems.
Multi-tone interference, first observed in October, suggesting a change in jamming tactics, potentially signaling more sophisticated techniques.
Long-duration interference events exceeding 7 hours were recorded, significantly disrupting GNSS-dependent maritime navigation, port operations, and infrastructure reliability.
Severe degradation in GNSS positioning accuracy was observed during interference events, with errors increasing from the nominal 3–5 meters to over 35 meters, posing safety and operational risks.
No correlation was found between terrestrial GNSS interference and ADS-B-based detections, reinforcing the limitations of relying solely on airborne interference monitoring systems to assess threats to ground-level infrastructure.
Strong indications of mobile maritime jamming sources were identified, with interference signals exhibiting movement patterns consistent with vessels navigating in the Baltic Sea.
